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Abstract The notion that opportunities exist objec-
tively ‘‘out there’’ has been repeatedly assaulted by
scholars who counter that opportunities are subjec-
tively constructed or created. This paper intends to
restore the balance by bringing the critical strands of
inquiry themselves under critical scrutiny. Beyond the
formulation of some original lines of critique and the
drawing of attention to some foundational yet insuf-
ficiently studied issues, this article further contributes
the following: (1) it juxtaposes a taxonomical ordering
of constructivist approaches; (2) it identifies angles of
complementarity and contradiction with the objectiv-
ist perspective; and (3) it brings subtle conceptual
distinctions into prominence.
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1 Introduction
According to the discovery approach to entrepreneur-
ship, opportunities exist ‘‘out there’’ as objective
phenomena awaiting discovery by alert entrepreneurs
(e.g., Shane 2003; Kirzner 1979). This dominant view
is increasingly under fire from scholars who maintain a
constructivist turn in the study of entrepreneurial
opportunities (Alvarez et al. 2010). As observed by
Wood and McKinley (2010: 67), ‘‘constructivist
ontology and epistemology is gaining traction within
the field of entrepreneurship’’ since there ‘‘appears to
be a growing contingent of scholars who feel that
constructivism may shed new light on parts of the
opportunity phenomenon that the discovery perspec-
tive is unable to illuminate.’’
Broadly speaking, constructivist critics reject the
presumed objectivity of opportunities to juxtapose that
opportunities are created (constructed, enacted, or
manufactured1) through subjectivist processes of
social construction (Alvarez et al. 2014; Garud and
Giuliani 2013; Sarason et al. 2010; Sarasvathy 2008;
Ardichvili et al. 2003; Bruyat and Julien 2001). In
short, on the foundational thesis that ‘‘opportunities do
not exist until entrepreneurs create them’’ (AlvarezS. Ramoglou (&)
Faculty of Business and Law, University of Southampton,
Highfield Campus, Southampton, England SO1 71BJ, UK
e-mail: s.ramoglou@soton.ac.uk
S. C. Zyglidopoulos
Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow,
Main Building, Glasgow, Scotland G12 8QQ, UK
e-mail: szyglidopoulos@gmail.com
1 One should be careful to avoid the supposition that this
richness of vocabulary stands for theoretical variation. As
stressed by Alvarez and Barney (2013), these words are





et al. 2013: 307), the constructivist reaction brings the
creative role of entrepreneurial actors center stage, to
juxtapose that it is entrepreneurial agency that is
‘‘fundamentally constitutive of [social] structure or
external reality’’ (Korsgaard 2011: 671).
Regardless of any weaknesses of the discovery
approach or strengths of the constructivist alternative,
it is noteworthy that it is only the former theorizing
strand that has undergone severe critical scrutiny. The
constructivist approach hardly ever receives any
critical attention, as though it serves as a panacea to
some of the most important and demanding problems
at the heart of entrepreneurial theory (Stuetzer et al.
2014; Pacheco et al. 2010; Kirzner 2009; McMullen
et al. 2007; see also Ripsas 1998; He´bert and Link
1989).
This paper intends to restore the balance by drawing
attention to the shortcomings of the constructivist
conceptualization of opportunities. Alas, this critique
cannot unfold along a single line of analysis since
there is considerable vagueness about what ‘‘opportu-
nity construction’’ means; a vagueness that arguably
results from the fact that constructivist scholars
typically use the same terminology to refer to fairly
diverse aspects of entrepreneurship-related phenom-
ena. In order, then, to critically examine the construc-
tivist conceptualization of opportunities, we first
disentangle the different strands of meaning that
constructivists house under the ‘‘opportunities are
created’’ thesis and, following this, critically evaluate
them separately.
But before we commence, an early clarification is in
order. Having maintained that there is considerable
confusion within the constructivist benches of scholar-
ship, we do not imply that the objectivist references to
opportunity conform to a unique and clear-cut under-
standing.2 As such, it is imperative that we first explicate
our understanding of opportunities against which our
critique of the constructivist alternative is going to
unfold. Our ‘‘objectivist’’ understanding subscribes to a
fairly standard economics-based (Kaish and Gilad 1991;
Casson 1982) and rather commonsensical understanding
of opportunities (Kim and Mauborgne 2005; Porter
1980) that may be concisely articulated as follows:
opportunities exist ‘‘out there’’ as unfulfilled market
needs, the satisfaction of which can generate revenue
that exceeds the production cost.
2 Disentangling the variety of meanings
A careful reading of constructivist discourse readily
exposes considerable ambiguity and imprecision
around the ways in which opportunities are said to
be created. While Sarasvathy (2001, 2012) frames
opportunities as the new worlds created by entrepre-
neurial effectuation, Gartner (2012: 26) advises that
opportunity is created from entrepreneurial sense-
making capabilities, whereas Korsgaard recommends
that ‘‘an opportunity may be enacted, e.g., as a
material artifact embodied in the text of a business
plan’’ (2011: 673). Elsewhere, we find Dimov (2011)
suggesting that opportunity can be traced in creative
entrepreneurial deeds, or Garud and Giuliani arguing
for a ‘‘‘subtext’ of creative energy that is the
wellspring of entrepreneurial opportunities’’ (2013:
158).
In disentangling the variety of meanings, we submit
that they essentially boil down to one of four senses of
‘‘opportunity creation,’’ each alluding to quite differ-
ent aspects of the entrepreneurial process. Specifi-
cally, they may refer to
(1) The imaginative inception of an opportunity;
(2) The formation of the conditions conducive to the
creation of entrepreneurial goods;
(3) The production of entrepreneurial goods; or
(4) The engineering of demand for produced goods.
In the following sections, we will critically evaluate
the idea that opportunities do not exist ‘‘out there’’ but
have to be constructed, in examining the meaningful-
ness and/or plausibility of interpreting the four afore-
mentioned stages through constructivist lenses.
To this end, we may further denominate as O1, O2,
O3, and O4 the senses of ‘‘opportunity creation’’
corresponding to each of the above stages. More
precisely, O1 refers to the approaches that lean toward
constructivism on the (mis)understanding that the
subjectivity of the opportunity-identification process
contradicts the intelligibility of their external exis-
tence. O2 refers to the (careless) practice of naming
2 There are approaches that reify opportunities (Baron 2004),
some that treat them as something quantifiable (Dahlqvist and
Wiklund 2012), and others that treat opportunities as ‘‘some-
thing’’ more ontologically complicated (Venkataraman et al.
2012). In addition, there is noticeable philosophical confusion
surrounding objectivist treatments (Ramoglou 2013).
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opportunity creation, the creation of the organizational
conditions required for the production of entrepre-
neurial products (or services). O3 covers cases in
which the creation of entrepreneurial products is
(equally misleadingly) labeled as opportunity crea-
tion. Lastly, O4 refers to perspectives that deny that
entrepreneurial opportunities (qua market demand)
preexist ‘‘out there’’ to (dubiously) recommend that
demand for entrepreneurial products is actually engi-
neered by skillful entrepreneurial deeds.
3 ‘‘Opportunities exist purely subjectively’’
When referring to the early stages of the entrepre-
neurial process, opportunities are said to be created in
the sense that they ‘‘emerge out of the imagination of
individuals’’ (Dimov 2004: 150) and reside ‘‘only in
the individual’s mind’’ (Chandler et al. 2003: 402). It
is submitted that this sense is fine to the extent that it
reacts to crude conceptualizations of opportunity
identification according to which opportunities are
seen literally with our eyes (e.g., Ucbasaran et al.
2008: 157).
Our strong caveat concerns the following: from the
correct recognition of ‘‘the subjective element in
pursuing opportunities’’ (Buenstorf 2007: 323), it does
not follow that opportunities do not exist ‘‘out there.’’
This conclusion only betrays commitment to extrav-
agant, idealist philosophical positions that treat the
external world as reducible to the constructs of the
individual and/or collective imagination. And although
exaggerated theses of this kind are quite fashionable in
modern philosophical literature (Hacking 1999; Searle
1998), they remain deeply flawed (Boghossian 2006;
Searle 1995).
In the context of entrepreneurial opportunities, a
fine expression of the idealist mind-set is offered by
Alvarez and Barney who maintain that, in virtue of
their socially constructed nature, opportunities ‘‘do not
exist independent of the entrepreneur’s perceptions’’
(2007: 15). Exposing the fallacies underlying this
idealist perspective is paramount, given especially that
pertinent philosophical intuitions ramify over several
streams of constructivist thought (see especially O4).
The idealist conclusion is not only strikingly
counterintuitive. Most importantly, it is logically
unwarranted. The fact that our knowledge of the
external world is mind-dependent does not mean that
the world itself must be a projection of our mental
processes. No doubt, our perceptions of the world are
hardly ever direct and unmediated. Different cognitive
systems process external input variously, whereas
cultural backgrounds and preconceptions certainly
influence how we make sense of the world. Yet, from
this realization, it does not follow that objective reality
is a mere projection of our mental processes. It only
follows that our interpretations of what is objectively
‘‘out there’’ are dependent upon subjective factors.
Reality itself remains ‘‘out there’’ and objectively real,
notwithstanding any mismatches between our percep-
tions of this reality and the reality as it exists in itself
(Bhaskar 1978).
It follows that entrepreneurial opportunities—as
unfulfilled market needs—exist ‘‘out there,’’ regard-
less of whether potential entrepreneurs have perceived
them or not, or whether they have the willingness to
exploit them, and so forth (Shane and Venkataraman
2000; Koellinger et al. 2007). They may remain
unperceived and unexploited, just as archeological
artifacts may remain undiscovered.
On a more moderate reading of the constructivist
critique, it does not dispute the objective existence of
the external world, but the presumed objectivity of its
social dimensions. In other words, a constructivist
scholar need not fall for a wholesale rejection of the
existence of an external realm, but may simply restrain
critical attention in questioning the reality of the social
world.
Without doubt, the social world does not exist in the
same way that elements of the natural world exist.
Markets or currencies are nothing like rocks or trees.
Still, however, from the acknowledgment that social
reality is dependent upon the ways that we think about
it, it does not follow that it is less real, let alone that it
exists in virtue of entrepreneurs’ thinking. It only
follows that it is differently real and that we ought to
distinguish between different kinds of reality (Searle
1995, 2002). Our perceptions may participate in
sustaining the reality of social objects; yet, their
existence neither requires individual acts of percep-
tion, nor is it reducible to the (collective) activity of
human minds (see also O4 below) (Bhaskar 1998).
To respond to Alvarez and Barney’s (2007: 15)
assertion that ‘‘opportunities are social constructions
that do not exist independent of the entrepreneur’s
perceptions’’, given that they are nothing like physical
objects (Alvarez et al. 2014), they may indeed exist as
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social constructions (or comprise social constructions
of sorts). But the conclusion that they do not them-
selves possess ontological weight, or that they do not
exist independently from the perception of any given
entrepreneur, is a non sequitur.3
In addition, to connect to the earlier quotation
expressing the aspiration ‘‘that constructivism may
shed new light on parts of the opportunity phenom-
enon that the discovery perspective is unable to
illuminate’’ (Wood and McKinley 2010: 67), up to
now, our analysis has cast a shadow of doubt on the
illuminating potential of constructivist philosophy. In
the forthcoming section, we will, moreover, ascertain
that O2 and O3 do not even manage to shed any light at
all onto the ‘‘opportunity phenomenon.’’
4 Novel insight or linguistic innovations?
According to our taxonomic account, the O2 sense of
opportunity creation refers to the creation of the
financial and/or institutional conditions conducive to
the production of entrepreneurial supplies, and O3
alludes to the creative processes involved in the
production of these entrepreneurial supplies (Corne-
lissen et al. 2012; Cornelissen and Clarke 2010;
Alvarez et al. 2010; Wood and McKinley 2010). Both
these aspects of the entrepreneurial process may
indeed be creative (and often require the deployment
of creative skills), but describing them as opportunity
creation does not seem to extend our theoretical reach
in any meaningful manner. It only appears to stretch
language in ways that pretend to offer novel theoret-
ical insight when, as a matter of fact, they only manage
to add confusion (compare with Garud and Giuliani
2013; Alvarez and Barney 2010). Let us unpack this.
Highlighting the social aspects involved in setting
up the organizational structures required for the supply
of entrepreneurial products should, unquestionably, be
commended. Not least, it adds a valuable drop of
realism that is often absent from abstracted from the
organizational world models of entrepreneurial activ-
ity (see, for example, Kirzner 1979). Most innovative
ventures do not simply demand the recognition of a
possible profit opportunity. They additionally require
the creation (O2) of appropriate organizational struc-
tures for the creation (O3) of the goods required for
their exploitation. Moreover, it is also reasonable to
acknowledge that these episodes of creation are not
reducible to mechanical deeds. Genuine creativity
should often be required during the production of
innovative goods or efforts targeted at acquiring the
socioeconomic structures necessary for their produc-
tion4 (Schumpeter 1983).
What is, nonetheless, highly questionable is
whether it is sensible, or at any rate useful, to refer
to these creative episodes as opportunity creation.
Consider, for example, Sarasvathy et al. (2010: 92),
who frame the creation of opportunity as the creation
of the ‘‘concrete products, services, and institutions
that constitute the economy.’’ What are created are not
opportunities but organizations, institutions, products,
services, and so on. To say that we ‘‘create opportu-
nity’’ when we ‘‘create products’’ is to basically let the
word ‘‘opportunity’’ parasitically take the place of the
word ‘‘products.’’ This misleading linguistic practice
is also common in reading Schumpeter as the propo-
nent of a constructivist understanding of opportunities
(cf. Kirzner 1999). Buenstorf’s mode of reasoning is
instructive:
Schumpeter does not explicitly feature the
opportunity concept. Instead, his point of depar-
ture is the notion of innovation characterized as
‘‘new combination’’ (Schumpeter 1911/[1983]).
The entrepreneur is an individual who creates a
new combination and pursues it in the market…
Clearly, the creation of a new combination can
be interpreted as the creation of an entrepre-
neurial opportunity (2007: 325).
In stark contrast to Buenstorf’s assessment, we submit
that it is far from clear that the creation of a new
3 If subjectivist scholars tend to suppose that, by virtue of being
part of a socially constructed reality, opportunities do not truly
exist ‘‘out there,’’ it appears that objectivists tend to reject
subjectivist references for an equally unfounded reason: for fear
that without treating opportunities as though they exist as
physical objects, we are left without an adequately real domain
to study (see Shane 2012).
4 For example, the acquisition of financial or human capital
may require the skillful manipulation of symbols, creative
preparation of a business plan, the deployment of rhetorical
devices, and all sorts of micro-institutional processes (Powell
and Colyvas 2008). And this should be especially the case if we
are talking about nascent firms lacking legitimacy (Aldrich and
Fiol 1994) or small businesses in eras of financial insecurity
(OECD 2009).
S. Ramoglou, S. C. Zyglidopoulos
123
combination may be meaningfully ‘‘interpreted’’ as
the creation of an entrepreneurial opportunity. On the
contrary, we argue that this undisciplined use of
language only begets confusion by sustaining the
misleading impression that we have competing view-
points of the opportunity phenomenon just because we
rely upon similar forms of expression.
After all, we should not forget that the objectively
existing opportunities that discovery scholars have in
mind are opportunities for profit (Kirzner 1973;
Casson 1982). As such, not only the O2 and O3 senses
of opportunity creation do not compete with the idea
that opportunities exist ‘‘out there.’’ In truth, it is
reasonable to suppose that not many discovery schol-
ars would object to the thesis that creative action may
be involved in the exploitation of objective (profit)
opportunities. To recap, when entrepreneurs create
artifacts at the supply side of the economy, it is simply
unclear what it may intelligibly mean to additionally
say that they create entrepreneurial opportunities as
well. This is especially the case given that we could
simply rephrase this by saying that in mobilizing/
recombining socioeconomic resources, entrepreneurs
create the means by which preexistent opportunities
can be exploited.
In closing this section, it is tempting to conjecture
that these linguistic innovations are essentially a side
effect of forced attempts to make original theoretical
contributions. To anticipate scholars who may counter
that this line of critique guards against theoretical
pluralism, and encourages theoretical stagnation and
isomorphism, we should note that this is far from the
case. Pluralism is unquestionably desirable. However,
the mark of an original contribution is not reducible to a
novel recombination of words in webs of signification.
In order for our academic discourses to qualify as novel
theoretical perspectives as well, they should (among
other things) satisfy the criterion of meaningfulness.
5 Opportunities are created in generating market
demand
Previously, we argued that it does not make very good
sense to label the creative processes involved in the
supply of entrepreneurial goods as opportunity crea-
tion. By contrast, however, we may meaningfully say
that (profit) opportunities have to be created when
denying the preexistence of demand for products and
invoking the creative processes required for its
generation. For instance, it is perfectly intelligible to
say that opportunities are created in the sense that
‘‘[t]here is no preexisting market to be analyzed and
penetrated’’ (Korsgaard 2011: 673) but ‘‘markets have
to be invented, fabricated, and constructed’’ (Sarasv-
athy 2003: 308).
Although this sense of opportunity construction
(O4) truly manages to provide a competing outlook to
the objectivist perspective, it fails on another front.
Specifically, it fails to afford a superior, and more
sustainable, ‘‘window’’ on basic aspects of the entre-
preneurial phenomenon. This assessment stands in
need of justification.
The (often only implicitly held) presupposition that
market demand is an agent-dependent phenomenon
contingent upon the ‘‘worldmaking’’ capacities of
entrepreneurs (Sarasvathy 2012) is at odds with our
ordinary understanding of the realistic. It runs contrary
to the trust that we typically place in our imagination
about what is possible within our world and implicitly
concedes to the (unrestrictedly) voluntarist view that
any type of crazy venture is (in principle) profitable.
This is unrealistic for the reason that, although we may
imaginatively entertain a multitude of possibilities, we
simply know that the realm of the naturally possible is
narrower than the realm of the imaginable. For
example, although we may have no problem imagin-
ing the creation of a company with the profit-making
potential of an Apple or a Google, we are (pre-
reflectively) aware that our imagination is not a
definitive guide to what is genuinely possible within
the boundaries of the real world. We may often
daydream. But we do not typically let ourselves fall for
any sort of fantasy.
Moreover, ‘‘worldmaking’’ fantasies are also
accountable for committing the fallacy of ‘‘social
atomism.’’ A lucid articulation of this methodological
fallacy may be found in Knight’s critique of the
presuppositions of neoclassical economists regarding
perfect competition. According to the modeling prac-
tices of neoclassical economics:
there is no exercise of constraint over any
individual by another individual or by ‘‘soci-
ety’’… Every member of society is to act as an
individual only, in entire independence of all
other persons. To complete his (sic) indepen-
dence he must be free from social wants,
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prejudices, preferences, or repulsions, or any
values which are not completely manifested in
market dealing (Knight 1921: 77–78).
To apply this critique in our case, the idea that we can
willingly manipulate market conditions presupposes
that there are no objective constraints over aspiring
entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur’s prospects of success
are ultimately dependent upon one’s wishes and
actions, since one can impose the market demand that
s/he desires. Social wants, prejudices, preferences,
repulsions, or values are negligible or, at any rate,
transformable by means of appropriate entrepreneurial
interventions. Even further, unrealistic stances of this
sort are additionally accountable for being the expres-
sions of dogmatic worldviews. To assert or imply that
the imaginable is equivalent to the possible is to
subscribe to a metaphysical dogma that is hardly ever
justifiable by means of rational analysis.
Despite the lack of plausibility, the fallacies that
they commit, or the metaphysical dogmatisms that
they presuppose, one should not downplay the fact that
constructivist extravagances may be appealing for
quite different reasons (cf. Bigo 2008). Searle’s (1995;
1998) observations into the alluring nature of con-
structivist ways of thought are potentially insightful in
understanding their academic popularity. He says:
It is somehow satisfying to our will to power to
think that ‘‘we’’ make the world, that reality
itself is but a social construct, alterable at will
and subject to future changes as ‘‘we’’ see fit.
Equally, it seems offensive that there should be
an independent reality of brute facts—blind,
uncomprehending, indifferent, and utterly unaf-
fected by our concerns. And all of this is part of
the general intellectual atmosphere that makes
[excessive constructivist ontologies] seem intel-
lectually acceptable, even exciting (1995: 158).
To recast this reasoning, it is, indeed, satisfying to feel
that we can construct the markets that we desire, as
though the possible is dependent upon our imagination
and our will, and our aspirations are unrestrained by
objective forces. From this standpoint, it is tempting to
conjecture that constructivist approaches of this kind
may also be appealing to the students of entrepreneur-
ship for the reason that it is understandably uplifting to
be told that entrepreneurship affords the means for
constructing the worlds that we desire.
6 Conclusion
The discovery approach to entrepreneurship has
suffered quite severe and extensive attacks (see
Korsgaard 2013), as opposed to the constructivist
alternative which has not yet received adequate critical
attention. The present paper has endeavored to restore
this balance. Having brought some initial order to the
constructivist take on opportunities, we carefully
examined the extent to which the constructivist
alternative may pave the way toward an advanced
conceptualization of entrepreneurial opportunities.
In general, the results of the analysis were largely
negative. The idea that opportunities exist ‘‘out there’’
as unfulfilled market needs (with a profit potential)
seems the most secure foundation of an opportunity-
centered study of entrepreneurship. True, creative
deeds may be required in the development of entre-
preneurial ventures or in trying to generate profits. But
these acts need not be understood as constitutive of
opportunities themselves. Instead, they may simply be
conceptualized as efforts capable of unleashing pre-
existing opportunities—akin to the fertilizers enabling
seeds to grow into healthy plants.
At this point, it should be emphasized that our
present exposition was made in the spirit of rational
deliberation, and by no means do we insinuate that we
have said the last word on matters so foundational to
entrepreneurial discourse. We far more modestly hope
to have planted some valuable seeds of skepticism,
opened up new arenas for rational dispute, and
directed attention toward some inadequately
reflected-upon issues at the very conceptual founda-
tions of entrepreneurship studies. Put differently, we
do not imply that objectivist approaches cannot be
improved, or that a more refined and philosophically
sophisticated constructivism is not possible. Our
present analysis has only found that the constructivist
developments—as they currently stand—do not
appear quite compelling, and considerable work
remains to be done if they are to afford a credible
alternative to the traditional, objectivist perspective.
In closing, it is worth mentioning that beyond its
more concrete contributions, the current study was
significantly motivated by the assessment that—con-
trary to customary appraisals—what is crucially
missing in entrepreneurial discourse (e.g., when
compared to related management-based disciplines)
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is not principally theory, databases, effort, imagina-
tion, intelligence, or institutional support. Far from
that, our guiding intuition had been that an obstacle
stalling the scientific progress of entrepreneurship
studies (Arend 2014) is insufficient attention to
matters standing in the thin line between empirical
inquiry and theory development, such as conceptual
clarity and order, or meta-theoretical reflexivity and
analysis. Put from a slightly different angle, as
entrepreneurship researchers, it seems that we often
overlook the notion that, if the vehicle for moving
forward along the path of scientific maturity lies in
empirical and theoretical inquiries, the vehicle itself is
blind and cannot be expected to progress without
being orientated by careful and patient analyses into
basic aspects of our conceptual schemes (see also
Miller and Tsang 2010).
If so, we far more often have to step back and
critically reflect upon matters that cannot be settled by
mere (or more) substantive research with an eye
toward forms of understanding that best resonate with
the pre-theoretical understandings that we most reli-
ably trust in our non-academic, everyday moments.
From a philosophy of science standpoint, to act
accordingly is to take the safest way to becoming a
genuinely scientific discipline—a subject matter truly
worthy of the intellectual respect of the broader social
sciences academy.
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